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Classifying malware correctly is an important research
issue for anti-malware software producers. This paper
presents an effective and efficient malware classification
technique based on string information using several well-
known classification algorithms. In our testing we extracted
the printable strings from 1367 samples, including un-
packed trojans and viruses and clean files. Information de-
scribing the printable strings contained in each sample was
input to various classification algorithms, including tree-
based classifiers, a nearest neighbour algorithm, statistical
algorithms and AdaBoost. Using k-fold cross validation on
the unpacked malware and clean files, we achieved a clas-
sification accuracy of 97%. Our results reveal that strings
from library code (rather than malicious code itself) can be
utilised to distinguish different malware families.
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1. Introduction
Developers of anti-malware software heavily rely on au-
tomatic malware analysis and detection techniques. Analy-
sis techniques are used to understand the behaviour of ma-
licious executables and to extract signatures useful for de-
tection and containment. Malware samples have generally
been examined in a relatively slow, manual process to deter-
mine the intent of the code and extract the signature. A ma-
jor challenge facing anti-malware researchers is the sheer
number of new malware samples which are appearing ev-
eryday. The manual examination of malware to determine
the intent of the code and extract the signature is a technique
which does not scale in accordance with the ever increasing
volume of malware. Most new malware samples are vari-
ants of pre-existing families. An automated malware classi-
fication system can therefore be an important aid to malware
researchers to speed up the analysis process. A substantial
amount of recent work has focused on development of tools
for collecting, monitoring and run-time analysis of malware
[1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19]. The security of present
computer systems thus crucially depends on the ability to
execute state-of-the-art anti-malware products.
The malware analysed in this paper is from CA’s VET
zoo (www.ca.com), thus it has been pre-classified using
generally acceptable mechanical means. Such a classifica-
tion relies on the ability to determine the significant fea-
ture or features which establish the true identification of the
malware. Signatures are short sequences of bytes which
are unique to the targeted malicious programs. Several of
the above research papers have been directed at determin-
ing signatures. The implication is that there is some unique
factor which defines a piece of code. While this may be the
case for a specific sample, given the many obfuscation tech-
niques, it is unlikely to be true for a general family; there
may be several features of a piece of code which together
indicate its purpose, but which separately do not definitively
reveal this information.
In the current paper we introduce string information as a
feature vector to develop an automatic malware categoriza-
tion system. In our experiment, we input string information
from 1367 samples, including unpacked Trojans, viruses
and clean files to a number of different classification algo-
rithms, including tree-based classifiers, nearest neighbour
algorithms, statistical learning algorithms and AdaBoost. In
order to perform our work efficiently, we use a database en-
vironment which provides us with an integrated manage-
ment interface, a standard format for binaries and interop-
erability with other tools and databases. We use Ida2sql
(www.dkbza.org), a Python module which exports disas-
sembly information from our disassembly tool IDA into the
SQL schema [4]. We show from our empirical evidence
that our model can achieve a classification accuracy of about
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97%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: background
on similar classification techniques is presented in Section
2. Section 3 describes our automated classification model
and describes the experimental set-up. The results are pre-
sented in Section 4; discussion and conclusions follow in
Section 5.
2. Related work
In recent years, researchers have turned their attention
to the analysis and classification of malware using many
different approaches. Some have used basic blocks of code
in the malware as in [8]. Basic blocks are defined as ‘a
continuous sequence of instructions that contains no jumps
or jump target’. The (string edit) distance between two basic
blocks is then defined to be the number of bytes in which the
blocks differ and is used to compare malware.
Kapoor and Spurlock [9] and Christodorescu et al. [6] ar-
gue that binary code comparison of the malware itself is not
satisfactory because it is error prone, can easily be affected
by the injection of junk code and because code comparison
algorithms are expensive with poor time complexity. They
argue that comparing malware on the basis of functional-
ity is more effective because it is really the behaviour of
the code that determines what it is. The major drawback of
these methods is the intensive preprocessing which must be
done in determining the weight to assign to each function.
Several authors have used sequences of system calls, API
calls and function calls of malware in order to model its
behaviour. Peisert et al. [11] use sequences of function calls
to represent program behaviour. Sathyanarayan et al. [13]
use static analysis to extract API calls from known malware
in order to construct a signature for an entire class. The
API calls of an unclassified sample of malware can then
be compared with the ‘signature’ API calls for a family to
determine if the sample belongs in the family or not. In our
opinion, obfuscation of API calls could affect the accuracy
of their results.
In [16], the authors use two aspects of functions to
classify unpacked viruses by using the k-fold validation
method: one is the length of the function as measured by the
number of bytes of code in it; the other is the frequency with
which function lengths occur within any particular sample
of malware. The results indicate that both function features
are significant in identifying the family to which a piece of
malware belongs. The results of this paper along with those
of several other recent papers are compared with our results
in Section 4.
Most classification approaches assume that the malware
is unpacked. Unpacking malware is a difficult and slow pro-
cess which needs techniques quite different from those used
for classification. Many research groups focus solely on the
unpacking problem. Thus we, along with most classifica-
tion researchers, assume that we are working with malware
which is not packed.
2.1. Overview of selected classification al-
gorithms
Many classification methods have been developed with
the aid of learning algorithms such as Bayesian, Decision
Tree, K-nn (K-nearest neighbour), Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and boosting. All these classifiers are basically
learning methods and adopt sets of rules. Bayesian clas-
sifiers are derived from Bayesian Decision Theory [7]. This
is the simplest and most widely used classification method
due to its manipulating capabilities of tokens and associated
probabilities according to the user’s classification decisions
and empirical performance.
Support vector machine (SVM) is a powerful, state-of-
the-art algorithm with strong theoretical foundations based
on Vapnik’s theory [17]. SVM has a strong data regulariza-
tion property and can easily handle high dimensional fea-
ture spaces. SVM is based on the Structural Risk Mini-
mization (SRM) principle, to find an optimal hyperplane by
maximizing the margins that can guarantee the lowest true
error due to increasing the generalization capabilities [7].
The SVM method we use, Sequential Minimal Optimiza-
tion, is a fast method to solve huge quadratic programming
problems, widely used to speed up the training of the Sup-
port Vector Machines.
Random Forest (RF) is a classifier that is based on a com-
bination of many decision tree predictors such that each tree
depends on the values of a random vector sampled inde-
pendently and with the same distribution for all trees in the
forest. RF has excellent accuracy among current classifier
algorithms [14]. Like SVM it runs efficiently on large data
bases and gives estimates of what variables are important in
the classification. This algorithm generates an internal unbi-
ased estimate of the error as the forest building progresses.
It also has an effective method for estimating missing data
and it maintains accuracy when a large proportion of the
data are missing [14].
The IB1 (Instance Based 1) algorithm is the sim-
plest instance-based learning algorithm; it is a nearest-
neighbour algorithm which in addition normalizes its at-
tributes’ ranges, processes instances incrementally, and has
a simple policy for tolerating missing values [9]. It uses
normalised Euclidean distance to find the training instance
closest to the given test instance. If multiple instances have
the same (smallest) distance to the test instance, the first one
found is used. It displays a high degree of similarity with
the condensed nearest neighbour algorithm, since it saves
and uses only selected instances for prediction. IB1 stores
all its training data and does not involve any training phase.
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The performance of IB1 depends on the data structure of the
input space.
The decision tree (DT) algorithm is a simple rule-based
algorithm based on a set of rules which takes advantage of
the sequential structure of decision tree branches so that the
order of checking rules and corresponding actions is imme-
diately noticeable. Those conditions and actions that are
critical are connected directly to other conditions and ac-
tions, whereas those conditions that do not matter are ig-
nored.
The Boosting method is a well established method for
improving the performance of any particular classifica-
tion algorithm. It is a relatively new framework for con-
structing a highly accurate classification rule by combining
many simple and moderately accurate hypotheses (called
weak classifiers) into a strong one. The weak classifiers
are trained sequentially and, conceptually, each of them is
trained mostly on the examples which were most difficult
to classify by the preceding weak classifiers. This method
was initially presented in [9], but its performance is still be-
ing studied. Ongoing research introduced a new generation
of Boosting method called AdaBoost (Adaptive Boosting)
[12], where the mapping functions are themselves learnt
from data from another learning algorithm.
The above analysis of the literature on classification al-
gorithms led to our choice of five algorithms, SVM, NB
(Naı¨ve Bayes), DT, RF, IB1 representing the spectrum of
major classification techniques available. We also decided
to apply AdaBoost to each of these to determine if in-
deed this improved our results. The data we obtained, pre-
sented in Section 4, shows that not all algorithms performed
equally well; however, in each case, AdaBoost was able to
improve classification performance.
3. Automated malware classification model
This section presents our automated malware classi-
fication model. The processing phases include: pre-
processing of the string data extracted from the software,
feature extraction and selection, classification itself, and
finally the evaluation of the classification result. We
utilise some machine learning algorithms provided by the
WEKA library (http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/
ml/weka/). This is a collection of machine learning al-
gorithms to perform data mining tasks. The algorithms can
either be applied directly to a dataset or called from inde-
pendent Java code. WEKA is open source software issued
under the GNU General Public License.
3.1. Architecture of the model
The general approach of our architecture is to extract a
set of features from each software sample that can be passed
Figure 1. Block diagram of our proposed
model.
to an automated classification system. We first unpacked the
malware samples and disassembled both unpacked malware
and clean samples using IDA. We then exported the disas-
sembly analysis to a database from which we extracted fea-
ture vectors. Finally, we constructed both test and training
data sets and called the WEKA library for classification and
validation. Figure 1 shows the architecture of our classifi-
cation system. Our interface with WEKA is described in
sub-section 3.2.4.
3.2. Overview of the architecture
This section outlines our proposed automated classifica-
tion model which is envisioned as in Figure 1. Our aim is to
automatically classify malware based on their string infor-
mation.
3.2.1 Data Acquisition:
A corpus of malware families collected from CA’s VET zoo
(www.ca.com) is used, along with a collection of clean files.
(The clean files were taken from the System32 directories of
Windows 98, Windows 2000, Windows 2003 and Windows
XP.) We use the unpacker tool VMUnpacker v1.3 to unpack
the packed samples in this experiment. For disassembling
the malware families, we use IDA Pro V5.1. Our system
uses Ida2sql, a Python module, to export the disassembly
information from IDA into an SQL database which we call
Ida2DB, as described in Figure 1. The database schema for
2009 4th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE) 25
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on April 12,2010 at 05:15:27 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Figure 2. Sample of string list
Ida2DB is adapted from a schema in Sabre-Security’s Bin-
Navi product. We modified the schema to support Microsoft
SQL Server DBMS, and we changed the database structure
to use a fixed number of tables in which to store binaries.
Table 1 lists the families used and numbers of samples per
family. The first 7 families have been pre-classified as tro-
jans; the next 3 families as viruses.













Table 1. Experimental Dataset
3.2.2 Feature extraction:
The aim of our feature extraction process, based on string
information, is to find features that are simple and inexpen-
sive to extract but that can be used to distinguish between
different families. A string is a consecutive sequence of
printable characters and this definition is often augmented
to specify a minimum length and a special character set.
For example, ‘ADVAPI32.dll’, ‘An unknown error has oc-
cured’, ‘ cexit’ are strings; they are consecutive sequences
of printable characters. The strings utility is designed spe-
cially to extract string content from files. IDA has a built-in
equivalent of the strings utility, which we used to extract
the strings from executables. (See Figure 2 for a sample.)
The column ‘frequency’ indicates the global frequency of
the string in our dataset. For each sample we created a
vector to represent which strings were present. We first
generated a global list of all the strings that occur in our
malware database. (We ignored strings of less than three
bytes as these tend to be extremely common non-malicious
strings and they unnecessarily add complexity to our com-
putations.) Each string is given an ordering in the list. For
each malware sample, we then tested which of the strings in
our global list it contains. This was computed efficiently by
using a hash table to store the global list and by doing hash
lookups on the strings contained in a given sample. The re-
sults were recorded in a binary vector, where for each string
in the global list, a 1 denoted that it was present and a 0 that
it was not.
Let G = {s1, s2, s3, . . . s|G|} be the global ordered set
of all strings; thus si might be the string kernel32 . Let F
represent the ordered set of malware families along with a
single family of clean files, n in all.
F = {f1, f2 . . . , fn}. (1)
Each malware family fi is a set of software modules. We
represent a module in the database by its module id M ij .
Thus, for any particular family fi, we can write
fi = {M i1,M i2, . . .M ik} (2)
where k is the number of modules in a particular family. We
can also view M ij as a binary vector capturing which of the
strings in the global set G are present in the sample; that is:










0 if the lthstring of G is not inmodule vectorM ij
1 otherwise
For example, if the global set G contained only 5 strings:
G = {“kernel32”, “advapi32”, “GetModuleHandleA”,
“OpenProcess”, “LoadLibrary”}
then M ij = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1) means the strings “kernel32”,
”GetModuleHandleA’ and ”LoadLibrary” are all present in
the sample M ij , whereas “advapi32” and “OpenProcess”
are not.
3.2.3 Feature selection:
Feature selection is a process that selects a subset of the
original features removing irrelevant, redundant or noisy
data. It also improves the performance of data classification
as well as speeding up the processing algorithm. We con-
sidered only the data in the training sets when we selected
the features.
For any particular family fi containing k modules, T =
{T1, T2, . . . , Tr} ⊆ fi represents a training set chosen from
the family fi. Then Q = fi – T = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk−r}
is used as a test set. Each entry Ti in the training set is
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represented by the vector Ti = (ti1, ti2, ..., tim), and each
entry Qi in the test set is represented by a vector Qi =
(qi1, qi2, . . . , qim′).
To select features for the family fi based on string in-
formation, we then selected a restricted ordered subset Gir
based on the global set G. That is -
Gir = {gir1, gir2, . . . , gir|Gi
r
|} (4)
where girj are the strings from the training set Tr for the
family fi ordered as in G when this string occurred with a
frequency of at least 10% in Tr.
The training sets can also be represented by binary vec-
tors of string information in the same way as the M ij shown
in equation (3); for a specific family fi,


















A frequency threshold of 10% was chosen. It reduced the
number of strings in set G from over 100,000 to a number
in the 100s (depending on the family). Preliminary work
showed that higher thresholds gave slightly better results
for some of the classfication algorithms. Determining the
optimal frequency threshold is a potential topic for future
investigation.
After reducing the set of strings to Gir we added some
negative samples to our sets T and Q, i.e. samples that do
not belong to family fi. Negative samples were needed to
train the classifier and for testing against false positives. We
randomly selected samples from the other families and cre-
ated standardised vectors for each sample using our reduced
set Gir.
3.2.4 The WEKA Interface
We built a program to interface with WEKA for data clas-
sification. The program reads from the IDA2DB database
to collect the data for pre-processing. After processing we
then generate the training and test data sets.
After generating T and Q, as in the previous section, we
convert both sets into WEKA format. We pass set T to the
WEKA library to train the classifier and then test the effec-
tiveness with set Q. Our program is designed in such a way
that the system can select the families and the correspond-
ing classifiers according to our requirements rather than the
default in WEKA. For example, in our AdaBoost classifica-
tion model, n = 5 base classifiers are used with one meta
classifier. We applied 5-fold cross validation in all cases.
The methodology used in our experiment can be sum-
marised in the following steps:
Figure 3. Comparison of classification accu-
racy (with and without boosting)
Step 1 Extract the features based on string information
Step 2 Generate string list based on the whole dataset.
Step 3 For each sample, check the occurrence of each string
from the string list, mapping each sample into a vector
(as described in section 3.2.2.)
Step 4 Build family fi, i = 1 . . . 11.
Step 5 Select a family fi and split it into 5 parts
Step 6 Build 5 sets T and Q using an 80% to 20% split
Step 7 Reduce the features by retaining only the strings which
occur in more than 10% of the samples in the training
set T
Step 8 For each set T and Q, take a random sample of mod-
ules from the other families to create supplementary
vectors which represent negative samples (i.e. not
from family fi). Add the negative sample vectors to
sets T and Q.
Step 9 Select the classifier
Step 10 Call WEKA libraries to train the classifier using the
training data T
Step 11 Evaluate the test data using set Q
Step 12 Repeat steps 9 to 11 for each classifier
Step 13 Repeat steps 5 to 12 for each family
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Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family FP FN Pr Re Acc FP FN Pr Re Acc
NB 0.015 0.1846 0.91821 0.897 0.904 0.011 0.141 0.9364 0.917 0.927
SVM 0.023 0.065 0.962 0.9505 0.955 0.0341 0.065 0.957 0.9443 0.951
IB1 0.0266 0.072 0.96 0.949 0.954 0.022 0.075 0.9591 0.9456 0.9551
RF 0.02 0.072 0.962 0.951 0.959 0.021 0.071 0.962 0.953 0.9595
DT 0.041 0.162 0.948 0.935 0.9487 0.0241 0.0591 0.9623 0.949 0.9625
Table 2. Average classification results of 11 families
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family FP FN Pr Re Acc FP FN Pr Re Acc
NB 0.0084 0.173 0.92527 0.9061 0.913 0.0075 0.128 0.9429 0.926 0.936
SVM 0.016 0.056 0.971 0.96 0.965 0.0215 0.0565 0.968 0.9557 0.964
IB1 0.0175 0.0529 0.971 0.963 0.967 0.0128 0.0582 0.9713 0.96 0.9701
RF 0.011 0.051 0.973 0.9647 0.972 0.011 0.0483 0.975 0.9681 0.975
DT 0.0291 0.167 0.952 0.941 0.954 0.021 0.0421 0.9645 0.9508 0.9642
Table 3. Weighted average classification results of 11 families
3.2.5 Measuring the classification effectiveness
The performance of classifier algorithms using supervised
learning algorithms is typically evaluated on the basis of
how well each correctly determines both membership and
non-membership in the target class. We refer to the four
possible outcomes as true positive TP (a classifier correctly
identifies an instance as being positive), false positive FP,
true negative TN and false negative FN, respectively.
The common standard metrics for measuring classifier
performance are then:
• Precision (P). This is the proportion of the predicted
positive cases that were correct, as calculated using the
equation P = TP/(TP + FP )
• Recall (R). This measures the portion of the correct
categories that were assigned, as calculated using the
equation R = TP/(TP + FN)
• Accuracy (A). This measures the portion of all deci-
sions that were correct, as calculated using the equa-
tion A = (TP + TN)/(TP + FP + TN + FN)
• Error (E). This corresponds to the number of misclas-
sifications on a given set of instances, as calculated us-
ing the equation E = (FP+FN)/(TP+FP+TN+
FN)
4 Experimental results
This section presents the classification outcome of the al-
gorithms. Table 2 presents the average of the experimental
results according to classifier. The family-wise detailed ex-
perimental results are given in the Appendix. Naı¨ve Bayes
gives the weakest results, while the other algorithms com-
pare very well with each other. The meta-classifier Ad-
aBoostM1 improves on all classifiers, with the exception
of SVM, but the difference is insignificant. Based on these
results, the best accuracy rate is above 96% (AdaBoostM1
with DT).
Since not all families were of the same size, we also
calculated a weighted average, where each family was
weighted according to the formula
nfi
nT
where nfi is the number of modueles in family fi, and nT
is the total number of modules (across all families). The
weighted average results are shown in Table 3. For all
parameters, the weighted results are better than the non-
weighted results. The Random Forest and IB1 classifiers
both achiever accuracies above 97%. Random Forest has
the best results overall.
Again, AdaBoostM1 improves on all classifiers with the
exception of SVM, but the difference is insignificant.
Our results show that string information can be used to
achieve high classification accuracy for the range of meth-
ods we tested, with the exception of Naı¨ve Bayes. This is
evidence that strings are a powerful feature for malware
classification. Perhaps surprisingly, many of the strings
used for classifying came from library code (rather than the
malicious code itself). This suggests that string informa-
tion can be used to identify which libraries the programs
used. Our classification method utilises the combination of
libraries used as part of its signature for the malware family.
In Table 4, we compare our results with some other re-
cent work classifying large sets of malware and achieving at
least 85% accuracy. Bailey et al. [1] describe malware be-
haviour in terms of system state changes (taken from event
logs). They compare over 3000 pre-classified samples with
over 3000 unclassified samples using a clustering technique
to measure closeness. They achieve over 91% accuracy.
Rieck et al. [12] used behavioural pattern analysis to
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Families Samples Accuracy Characteristics Used
K. Rieck et. al (2008) [12] 14 10,000 88% Behavioural patterns
M. Bailey et. al (2007) [1] unknown 8,000 91.6% Behaviour
Z. Shafiq et.al (2009) [14] unknown 1,200 95% This paper compares only clean with malicious files
Tian, R et.al. (2008) [16] 7 721 87% Function length frequency
Our method 11 1,367 97% Printable string information
Table 4. Comparison of our model with existing work
classify differences between 14 families of Trojans (3) and
worms (11) based on a total of over 10,000 samples. They
used training, test and validation sets and applied SVM clas-
sifiers choosing the best such classifier family by family.
Overall performance is determined by using a combined
classifier on the testing partition. Approximately 88% true
positive allocation is achieved.
Tian et al. [16] use an analysis similar to the one de-
scribed in the current paper to classify 7 families of Tro-
jans comprising over 700 samples. Over 87% accuracy is
achieved.
Finally, we include recent work by Shafiq et al. [14]
whose aim is to compare the performance of evolutionary
and non-evolutionary algorithms in distinguishing between
malware and cleanware. They report over 95% accuracy by
all algorithms chosen in making this distinction.
5 Conclusion
We present an effective malware classification technique
based on the printable strings contained within the executa-
bles. We chose five algorithms, representative of five dif-
ferent generic approaches to classification and used each of
them separately and then each in conjunction with a boost-
ing technique AdaBoost. Writing an interface with WEKA,
we were able to effectively develop a 5-fold cross-validation
test based on training and test sets chosen from the families.
Our experiments show that the IB1 and Random Forest clas-
sification methods were the most effective for this domain.
Using these methods we achieved an overall classification
accuracy of 97%.
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Appendix
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family Sample No. FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc
clagger 47 0 0.155 0.942 0.923 0.961 0.924 0 0.088 0.965 0.956 0.9938 0.958
robknot 101 0 0.11 0.964 0.945 0.9525 0.948 0 0.1 0.964 0.95 0.966 0.956
robzip 82 0.05 0.33 0.845 0.8062 0.8328 0.836 0.05 0.27 0.85 0.812 0.843 0.854
alureon 43 0.1 0.125 0.91 0.89 0.9843 0.892 0.05 0.1 0.934 0.925 0.9781 0.928
bambo 41 0 0.4 0.874 0.8 0.867 0.802 0.025 0.35 0.862 0.813 0.896 0.814
beovens 144 0 0.11 0.955 0.943 0.99 0.95 0 0.035 0.984 0.982 0.998 0.985
boxed 263 0.003 0.02 0.99 0.986 0.992 0.99 0.003 0.02 0.99 0.986 0.992 0.99
emerleox 78 0 0.306 0.892 0.847 0.913 0.85 0 0.213 0.927 0.893 0.9331 0.896
Looked 67 0.01 0.23 0.82 0.86 0.865 0.864 0 0.25 0.87 0.83 0.9 0.874
Agobot 340 0 0.27 0.893 0.862 0.863 0.866 0.005 0.191 0.92 0.901 0.931 0.91
Avg 1206 0.01525 0.184667 0.91821 0.89785 0.93238 0.90342 0.011083 0.141417 0.936417 0.917333 0.95075 0.927083
W. Avg 0.008477 0.17395 0.92527 0.906125 0.92734 0.91179 0.007581 0.128843 0.942969 0.92682 0.953251 0.936168
claen files 161 0.15 0.068 0.9 0.93 0.97 0.896 0.05 0.05 0.945 0.943 0.98 0.95
Table 5. Naı¨ve Bayes
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family Sample No. FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc
clagger 47 0.021 0.133 0.933 0.921 0.923 0.9333 0.04 0.06 0.95 0.944 0.949 0.946
robknot 101 0 0.06 0.998 0.987 0.98 0.99 0 0.06 0.98 0.97 0.978 0.98
robzip 82 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.1 0 0.96 0.95 0.957 0.962
alureon 43 0.13 0.075 0.91 0.887 0.888 0.899 0.15 0.15 0.875 0.85 0.871 0.865
bambo 41 0.02 0.012 0.94 0.93 0.933 0.938 0.02 0.012 0.94 0.936 0.945 0.94
beovens 144 0 0.021 0.99 0.989 0.9892 0.99 0 0.021 0.99 0.989 0.9893 0.99
boxed 263 0 0.03 0.99 0.982 0.986 0.988 0 0.03 0.99 0.982 0.986 0.99
emerleox 78 0 0.1 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.948 0 0.1 0.964 0.95 0.954 0.95
Looked 67 0.02 0.25 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.866 0.02 0.25 0.914 0.861 0.862 0.87
Agobot 340 0.03 0.06 0.964 0.95 0.9558 0.96 0.02 0.06 0.968 0.95 0.9558 0.965
Avg 1206 0.023417 0.065083 0.96275 0.9505 0.95125 0.95519 0.034167 0.06525 0.957417 0.944333 0.949758 0.951083
W. Avg 0.016426 0.056717 0.9716 0.96037 0.96239 0.96588 0.021514 0.056557 0.968603 0.955701 0.96062 0.964236
claen files 161 0.06 0.05 0.94 0.94 0.943 0.942 0.06 0.06 0.94 0.934 0.943 0.94
Table 6. SVM
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family Sample No. FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc
clagger 47 0 0.111 0.95 0.944 0.944 0.9444 0.044 0.0111 0.942 0.922 0.968 0.936
robknot 101 0 0.067 0.974 0.965 0.965 0.966 0 0.1 0.968 0.95 0.964 0.962
robzip 82 0.1 0.012 0.967 0.953 0.973 0.964 0 0.1 0.966 0.95 0.967 0.962
alureon 43 0.075 0.15 0.896 0.887 0.8875 0.89 0.075 0.2 0.876 0.863 0.925 0.876
bambo 41 0.025 0.125 0.9324 0.925 0.925 0.928 0.025 0.1 0.9434 0.9375 0.975 0.94
beovens 144 0 0.029 0.987 0.986 0.986 0.988 0 0.028 0.987 0.986 0.986 0.99
boxed 263 0 0.02 0.996 0.99 0.99 0.99 0 0.02 0.996 0.99 0.996 0.994
emerleox 78 0 0.026 0.99 0.986 0.987 0.988 0 0.026 0.99 0.986 0.987 0.988
Looked 67 0 0.24 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.885 0 0.24 0.93 0.87 0.886 0.89
Agobot 340 0.02 0.044 0.967 0.963 0.968 0.97 0.02 0.044 0.97 0.963 0.97 0.97747
Avg 1206 0.026667 0.072 0.96087 0.949917 0.95371 0.95437 0.022 0.075758 0.959117 0.945625 0.963583 0.955167
W. Avg 0.01757 0.052956 0.97169 0.963313 0.96687 0.96765 0.012809 0.058262 0.971336 0.96074 0.972198 0.970141
claen files 161 0.04 0.2 0.892 0.87 0.878 0.882 0.05 0.18 0.893 0.88 0.932 0.884
Table 7. IB1
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family Sample No. FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc
clagger 47 0 0.111 0.943 0.934 0.973 0.941 0.022 0.088 0.952 0.945 0.973 0.948
robknot 101 0 0.06 0.9769 0.97 100 0.97 0 0.06 0.975 0.97 0.99 0.975
robzip 82 0.1 0.0125 0.958 0.9537 0.954 0.976 0.1 0.03 0.945 0.946 0.962 0.954
alureon 43 0.05 0.175 0.91 0.89 0.975 0.92 0.05 0.2 0.901 0.88 0.972 0.895
bambo 41 0.025 0.125 0.9323 0.925 0.944 0.928 0.02 0.12 0.9323 0.93 0.944 0.93
beovens 144 0 0.029 0.99 0.985 0.999 0.99 0 0.02 0.99 0.99 1 0.99
boxed 263 0 0.03 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.986 0 0.02 0.99 0.984 0.991 0.99
emerleox 78 0 0.04 0.982 0.98 0.986 0.982 0 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Looked 67 0.01 0.22 0.932 0.883 0.916 0.89 0 0.23 0.934 0.88 0.94 0.896
Agobot 340 0 0.03 0.984 0.973 0.985 0.983 0 0.029 0.988 0.98 0.99 0.99
Avg 1206 0.020417 0.072708 0.96218 0.951975 9.22499 0.95967 0.021 0.071417 0.962942 0.95375 0.977492 0.9595
W. Avg 0.011075 0.051427 0.97311 0.964734 8.74465 0.97242 0.011199 0.048374 0.975847 0.968144 0.984206 0.974488
claen files 161 0.075 0.062 0.934 0.931 0.975 0.938 0.05 0.062 0.946 0.943 0.982 0.948
Table 8. RandomForest
Base Classifier Meta Classifier — AdaBoostM1
Family Sample No. FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc FP FN Pr Re AUC Acc
clagger 47 0 0.121 0.965 0.945 0.971 0.967 0 0.088 0.962 0.944 0.991 0.962
robknot 101 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
robzip 82 0.12 0.07 0.934 0.943 0.939 0.948 0.112 0.037 0.94 0.946 0.9533 0.958
alureon 43 0.2 0.27 0.84 0.802 0.858 0.83 0.025 0.125 0.94 0.925 0.981 0.928
bambo 41 0.02 0.05 0.969 0.963 0.975 0.97 0 0.05 0.98 0.975 0.975 0.98
beovens 144 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.985 0.991 0.996 0.01 0 0.99 0.985 0.991 0.996
boxed 263 0.007 0.08 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.003 0.05 0.98 0.973 0.995 0.98
emerleox 78 0.02 0.1 0.964 0.943 0.97 0.96 0.02 0.1 0.968 0.943 0.984 0.967
Looked 67 0.1 0.2 0.85 0.8 0.89 0.842 0.1 0.2 0.85 0.8 0.89 0.846
Agobot 340 0.02 0.012 0.94 0.93 0.933 0.942 0.02 0.01 0.954 0.93 0.95 0.948
Avg 1206 0.041417 0.16275 0.94883 0.935917 0.95725 0.94875 0.024167 0.059167 0.962333 0.94925 0.974192 0.9625
W. Avg 0.029193 0.167847 0.95231 0.941494 0.96039 0.95343 0.021388 0.042139 0.964596 0.950833 0.972715 0.964201
claen files 161 0.16 0.1 0.87 0.87 0.894 0.87 0.09 0.05 0.93 0.925 0.97 0.93
Table 9. DecisionTable
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